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Abstract
A new method for computing strong Nash equilibria in multiplayer games
that uses the theoretical framework of generative relations combined with a
stochastic search method is presented. Generative relations provide a mean
to compare two strategy profiles and to assess their relative quality with
respect to an equilibria type. The stochastic method used, called Aumann
Crowding Based Differential Evolution (A-CrDE), uses a Differential Evo-
lution algorithm that has been successfully used for numerical optimization
problem. Numerical experiments illustrate the efficiency of the approach.
Keywords:
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1. Introduction
Strong Nash equilibrium (SNE) or Aumann equilibrium is one of the
most appealing equilibrium concepts in non-cooperative game theory [1, 2, 3].
Proposed by Aumann [4] as an alternative to the Nash equilibrium (NE),
SNEs take into account the fact that some of the players, although having
no unilateral incentive to deviate, may benefit (sometimes substantially) from
forming alliances/coalitions with other players. While in a NE no player can
improve its payoff by unilateral deviation, in a SNE there is no coalition
of players that can improve their payoffs (by collective deviation). Thus,
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SNEs present the advantages of a cooperative behavior in a non-cooperative
environment.
Two major downsides appear when dealing with SNEs:
• SNEs need not exist for all games; however, this paper is concerned
only with games that present at least one SNE;
• the computational complexity related to the necessity of considering
all possible coalitions among players.
In spite of that, the strong Nash equilibrium is a robust, worth exploring
equilibrium concept; the importance of SNEs is widely studied for classes of
games that allow the characterization of SNEs, such as congestion games [5],
network games [6, 7], voting models [8, 9], etc.
Although the existence and properties of SNEs have been studied [10],
there are few computational tools available for computing the SNEs. The
complexity of computing a SNE is known to be NP − complete [11, 12].
For pure strategy SNEs there are several algorithms designed for specific
classes of games: congestion games [13, 14, 15, 16], connection games [17],
continuous games [10]. An algorithm for detecting strong Nash equilibrium
in bottleneck congestion games is described in [18]. Properties, existence
conditions, and an analytical algorithm are described in [10].
The aim of this article is to compute SNEs using a heuristic search al-
gorithm. In order to accomplish that, a method to compare two strategy
profiles with respect to the characteristics of SNEs and decide if one is “bet-
ter” than the other is needed. Such a binary relation has been proposed in
[19] and successfully used to approximate SNEs. This paper studies theoret-
ical aspects related to this relation and furthermore proposes two variants
that are less computational consuming in terms of running time.
The rest of the article is organized as follows: Section 2 presents some
basic Game Theory notions (non-cooperative game, Nash equilibrium, strong
Nash equilibrium). Section 3 describes the generative relations necessary for
the equilibrium detection (the strong Nash, probabilistic strong Nash non-
dominated relation) and Section 4 the evolutionary approach. In Section 5
numerical experiments are presented. The paper ends with Conclusions.
2. Strong Nash equilibria definitions
A non-cooperative game is described by a system of players, actions and
payoffs. Each player has some actions/strategies available and a payoff func-
tion that takes into account the actions of all players.
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Formally, a finite strategic non-cooperative game Γ is a system Γ =
(N, S, U), where:
• N represents a set of players, and n is the number of players;
• for each player i ∈ N , Si is the set of actions available, and
S = S1 × S2 × ...× Sn
is the set of all possible situations of the game. An element s ∈ S,
s = (s1, s2, ..., sn), is called a strategy (or strategy profile) of the game
with si denoting the strategy of player i;
• U = (u1, ..., un) is the set of payoff functions; for each i ∈ N , ui : S → R
represents the payoff function of player i.
Let P(N) be the power set of N , containing all possible player coalitions
and I a nonempty set of P(N). Then N−I = {i ∈ N ; i 6∈ I} is the set of the
rest of the players. If I = {i}, i.e. contains only one player, instead of N − I
we will write −i. Using these notations, if s, q ∈ S, (sI , qN−I) denotes the
strategy in which players from I play their strategies from s and players from
N−I their strategies from q. If I = {i}, (si, q−i) = (q1, ..., qi−1, si, qi+1, ..., qn).
The Nash equilibrium [20] is a strategy profile such that no player can
unilaterally change her/his strategy to increase her/his payoff.
Definition 1 (Nash equilibrium). A strategy profile s∗ ∈ S is a Nash equi-
librium if the inequality
ui(si, s
∗
−i) ≤ ui(s
∗),
holds, ∀i = 1, ..., n, ∀si ∈ Si.
A Pareto efficient (or optimal) strategy is a situation in which no player
can improve his/her payoff without decreasing the payoff of someone else.
Definition 2 (Pareto efficiency). A strategy profile s∗ ∈ S is Pareto efficient
if there does not exist a strategy s ∈ S such that
ui(s) ≥ ui(s
∗), ∀i ∈ N,
with at least one strict inequality.
The strong Nash (or Aumann) equilibrium is a strategy for which no
coalition of players has a joint deviation that improves the payoff of each
member of the coalition.
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Definition 3 (Strong Nash equilibrium). The strategy s∗ is a strong Nash
(Aumann) equilibrium if ∀I ⊆ N, I 6= ∅ there does not exist any sI such that
the inequality
ui(sI , s
∗
N−I) > ui(s
∗)
holds ∀i ∈ I.
Let us denote by SNE(Γ) the set of strong Nash equilibria of the game
G and by NE(Γ) the set of Nash equilibria in the game Γ.
The following remarks about SNEs are obvious from the definition.
Remark 1. • Considering that if we choose deviating coalitions com-
posed from a unique player it is clear that the strong Nash equilibrium
reduces to the Nash equilibrium and we can write
SNE(Γ) ⊆ NE(Γ).
• The definition of SNE implies that any SNE is Pareto efficient [21].
Evenmore, Nash equilibrium that is also Pareto efficient is a strong
Nash equilibrium [22].
• SNE does not always exists in any non-cooperative games.
Example 1. Let us consider a two person coordination game with payoffs
presented in Table 1. The game has two NEs in pure form: (A,A) and
(B,B), with the corresponding payoffs (5, 5) and (4, 4), and one NE in mixed
form. Only the strategy profile (A,A) is a strong Nash equilibrium.
Table 1: The payoff matrix for Example 1
Player 2
A B
Player 1 A (5,5) (3,1)
B (2,3) (4,4)
3. Generative relations
Generative relations are used to characterize a certain equilibrium
type by using the non-dominance concept. A binary relation R is defined
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on S. If we have sRq, with s, q ∈ S, then we say that s dominates q with
respect to relation R. Conversely, if, for some s, ∄q such that qRs, we call s
non-dominated with respect to relation R.
Relation R is called generative for an equilibrium type if the set of non-
dominated strategy profiles with respect to relation R equals the set of equi-
libria.
A generative relation for the Nash equilibrium was introduced in [23].
Other generative relations were defined for modified strong Nash and coali-
tion proof Nash equilibrium in [24], and for strong Berge equilibrium in [25].
In what follows a generative relation for SNEs is presented.
3.1. Generative relation for strong Nash equilibrium
In what follows we will assume that the considered game presents at least
one strong Nash equilibrium.
A relative quality measure of two strategies with respect to strong Nash
equilibrium can be defined as [26]:
a(s∗, s) = card[i ∈ I, ∅ 6= I ⊆ N, ui(sI , s
∗
N−I) > ui(s
∗), si 6= s
∗
i ],
where card[M ] denotes the cardinality of the multiset M (an element i can
appear several times inM and each occurrence is counted in card[M ]). Thus,
a(s∗, s) counts the total number of players that would benefit from collectively
switching their strategies from s∗ to s.
Definition 4. Let s∗, s ∈ S. We say that strategy s∗ is better than strategy
s with respect to strong Nash equilibrium (or strong Nash dominates strategy
s), and we write s∗ ≺A s if the following inequality holds:
a(s∗, s) < a(s, s∗).
Thus, strategy s∗ is better in strong Nash sense than a strategy s if there
are less players that would be able to increase their payoffs by entering in a
coalition that switches strategies from s∗ to s than vice-versa.
Definition 5. The strategy profile s∗ ∈ S is called strong Nash non-dominated
(ANS) if there is no strategy s ∈ S, s 6= s∗ such that:
s ≺A s
∗.
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Our assumption is that ≺A is a generative relation for strong Nash equi-
libria, i.e. the set of non-dominated strategies with respect to ≺A is equal to
the set of strong Nash equilibria of the game. In order to prove that, we will
use the following property.
Proposition 1. A strategy profile s∗ ∈ S is a strong Nash equilibrium if and
only if the equality
a(s∗, s) = 0
holds for all s ∈ S.
Proof. (i) Let s∗ ∈ S be a SNE. Suppose there exists a strategy profile s ∈ S,
such that a(s∗, s) = w, w > 0. Therefore there exists a set I, I ⊆ N, I 6= ∅,
and i ∈ I, such that
ui(sI , s
∗
N−I) > ui(s
∗), sI 6= s
∗
I .
This contradicts the definition of SNE.
(ii) Let s∗ ∈ S be a strategy profile such that
∀s ∈ S, a(s∗, s) = 0.
This means that
ui(sI , s
∗
N−I) ≤ ui(s
∗)
for all I ⊆ N, i ∈ I, and for any strategy s ∈ S. Therefore s∗ is strong Nash
equilibrium.
Proposition 2. All SNEs are strong Nash non-dominated solutions, i.e.
SNE ⊆ ANS.
Proof. Let s∗ ∈ SNE. Suppose s∗ is strong Nash dominated. Therefore
there exists a strategy profile s ∈ S dominating s∗:
s ≺A s
∗.
From the definition of relation ≺A, we have
a(s, s∗) < a(s∗, s),
and from Proposition 1:
a(s∗, s) = 0.
Therefore
a(s, s∗) < 0.
But this is impossible as a(s, s∗) denotes the cardinality of a multiset.
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Proposition 3. All strong Nash non-dominated solutions are strong Nash
equilibria, i.e.
ANS ⊆ SNE.
Proof. Let s∗ be an strong Nash non-dominated strategy profile. Suppose
s∗ 6∈ SNE. Therefore there must exist (at least one) non-empty coalition J,
j ∈ J and a strategy sJ ∈ S, such that
uj(sJ , s
∗
N−J) > uj(s
∗), ∀j ∈ J. (1)
We consider the coalition fixed, i.e. J = {ji1 , ji2 , ..., jik}. Let us denote
q = (sJ , s
∗
N−J). Eq. (1) can be written as:
uj(q) > uj(s
∗), ∀j ∈ J. (2)
We have
a(s∗, q) = card[i ∈ I, ∅ 6= I ⊆ N, ui(qI , s
∗
N−I) > ui(s
∗), qi 6= s
∗
i ].
which is equivalent with:
a(s∗, q) = card[i ∈ I, ∅ 6= I ⊆ N, ui(sj , s
∗
N−j) > ui(s
∗), sj 6= s
∗
i ].
From (2) it follows that
a(s∗, q) > 0. (3)
On the other hand we have:
a(q, s∗) = card[i ∈ I, ∅ 6= I ⊆ N, ui(s
∗
I , qN−I) > ui(q), s
∗
i 6= qi, ∀i ∈ I].
But qi 6= s
∗
i holds only for i = j, j ∈ J. Hence
a(q, s∗) = card[j, uj(s
∗
J , qN−J) > uj(q)].
But
(s∗J , qN−J) = s
∗.
Thus a(q, s∗) can be written as follows:
a(q, s∗) = card[j, uj(s
∗) > uj(q)].
From (2) it results, that:
a(q, s∗) = 0. (4)
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From (3) and (4) we have:
a(q, s∗) < a(s∗, q),
which means that q ≺A s∗. The hypothesis that s∗ is non-dominated is thus
contradicted.
Proposition 4. Relation ≺A is a generative relation for strong Nash equi-
libria, i.e.
SNE = ANS.
Proof. Follows directly from Proposition 2 and Proposition 3.
Although ≺A is a generative relation for SNEs, it presents the major
disadvantage that up to n2n payoff function evaluations are necessary with
the corresponding computation of all 2n−1 possible coalitions. Because this
makes ≺A impractical from a computational point of view when dealing with
a large number of players, two alternatives are proposed in what follows.
3.2. Probabilistic generative relation for strong Nash equilibrium
In order to reduce the number of evaluations a probabilistic model that
only takes into account some randomly generated coalitions is proposed.
In the case of n players the total number of possible coalitions is 2n − 1.
Consider a percent p and Ap ⊂ P(N) be a set of nonempty subsets of N
(possible coalitions) such that card{Ap} = [p(2n − 1)], where [·] denotes the
integer part. The relative quality measure of two strategy profiles s and s∗
with respect to Ap is:
ap(s
∗, s) = card[i ∈ I, ∅ 6= I ⊆ Ap, ui(sI , s
∗
N−I) > ui(s
∗), si 6= s
∗
i ],
Definition 6. Let s∗, s ∈ S. Strategy s∗ is Ap-better than strategy s with
respect to strong Nash equilibrium (or s∗ probabilistic strong Nash dominates
strategy s), and we write s∗ ≺Ap s if the following inequality holds:
ap(s
∗, s) < ap(s, s
∗).
Obviously, if p = 100% the ≺Ap is identical to ≺A.
Definition 7. For a given p 6= 0, strategy s∗ ∈ S is called p-strong Nash
non-dominated (pANS) if there does not exists any s ∈ S, s 6= s∗ such that:
s ≺Ap s
∗
for any Ap ⊂ P(N) with card{Ap} = [p(2n − 1)] 6= 0.
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In the following we will show that ≺Ap is also a generative relation for
strong Nash equilibria, i.e. the set of p−non-dominated strategies with re-
spect to ≺Ap approximates the set of strong Nash equilibria of the game.
Proposition 5. For any p 6= 0, ≺Ap is a generative relation for strong Nash
equilibria, i.e. SE = pANS.
Proof. The first implication is obvious (all SNEs are p-strong Nash non-domi-
nated), with the proof analogous with that of Prop. 2.
For the second one, pANS ⊆ SE, it is enough, based on Prop. 4, to show
that pANS ⊆ ANS.
Consider s ∈ pANS such that s 6∈ ANS. If s 6∈ ANS, there exists q ∈ S
such that q ≺A s, a.i.
a(q, s) < a(s, q).
Let {Ik}k=1,...,mq be the family of mq coalitions such that
ui(qIk , sN−Ik) > ui(s)
and denote by m = [p(2n − 1)], m 6= 0.
If m > mq then construct a family Ap by including all Ik and any other
coalitions. If m ≤ mq then construct Ap consisting of only coalitions Ik, such
that at least one for which the relation
ui(sI , qN−I) > ui(q) ∀i ∈ I
is not satisfied is included. Such a coalition exists, otherwise q would not
strong Nash dominate s.
Then, for Ap, we can write:
ap(q, s) < ap(s, q)
contradicting the hypothesis that s ∈ pANS.
The probabilistic relation defined above presents the advantage of requir-
ing less payoff function evaluations than ≺A.
9
4. Evolutionary approach
Games - in which players try to simultaneously maximize their own pay-
offs - are similar with multi-objective optimization problems (MOPs) in many
features. Population based metaheuristics that can deal with MOPs and are
capable of finding of the Pareto optimal set can easily be adapted, by us-
ing an appropriate generative relation, to compute certain game equilibrium
types.
In this section a new evolutionary algorithm, based on the Crowding based
Differential Evolution algorithm for multimodal optimization [27], called
strong Nash Crowding Differential Evolution Algorithm (A-CrDE) is pre-
sented. A-CrDE uses the generative relations defined in Section 3 to evolu-
tionary compute the strong Nash equilibria of a game.
A-CrDE population. The individuals from population P represent strategy
profiles of the game (s = (s1, s2, ..., sn), n is the number of players) that are
randomly initialized in the first generation.
Crowding Differential Evolution. CrDE extends the Differential Evolution
(DE) algorithm with a crowding scheme [27]. CrDE is based on the conven-
tional DE, the only modification is made regarding the individual (parent)
being replaced. Usually, the parent producing the offspring is substituted,
whereas in CrDE the offspring replaces the most similar individual among
the population if it Aumann dominates it. A DE/rand/1/exp scheme is used,
as described in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 CrDE - the DE/rand/1/exp scheme
Create offspring O[l] from parent P [l]
1: O[l] = P [l]
2: randomly select parents P [i1], P [i2], P [i3], where i1 6= i2 6= i3 6= i
3: n = U(0, dim)
4: for j = 0; j < dim ∧ U(0, 1) < pc; j = j + 1 do
5: O[l][n] = P [i1][n] + F ∗ (P [i2][n]− P [i3][n])
6: n = (n+ 1) mod dim
7: end for
While a final condition is not fulfilled (for example the current number of
fitness evaluations performed is below the maximum number of evaluations
allowed), for each individual l from the population, an offspring O[l] is created
10
using the scheme presented in Algorithm 1, where U(0, x) is a uniformly dis-
tributed number between 0 and x, pc denotes the probability of crossover, F
is the scaling factor, and dim is the number of problem parameters (problem
dimensionality, number of players in this case).
The generative relation. Within CrDE the offspring O[l] replaces the most
similar parent P [j] if it is fitter. Otherwise, the parent survives and is passed
on to the next generation (iteration of the algorithm). Euclidean distance,
or any other similarity measure can be used. Within A-CrDE an offspring
replaces the parent if it is better than it with respect to the strong Nash
equilibrium. Three variants of A-CrDE are considered, each one using one
of the generative relations presented in Section 3.
Outline of A-CrDE. The A-CrDE algorithm is outlined in Algorithm 2. The
output of the algorithm consists on the set of strong Nash nondominated
solutions in the last iteration that approximates the set of strong Nash equi-
libria of the game.
Algorithm 2 A-CrDE
1: Randomly generate initial population P0 of strategies;
2: while (not termination condition) do
3: for each l = {1, ..., population size} do
4: create offspring O[l] from parent l;
5: if O[l] strong Nash dominates the most similar parent j then
6: O[l] replaces parent j;
7: end if
8: end for
9: end while
5. Numerical experiments
The detection of strong Nash equilibria using A-CrDE is illustrated for
two games that present a SNE. Reported results are averaged over ten runs.
Parameter settings used for numerical experiments are presented in Table 2.
Each run, the algorithm reports the distance to the real value of the SNE of
the game.
All of the experiments were run on a computer with 3.07 GHz CPU and
12 GB main memory.
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Table 2: Parameter settings for A-CrDE used for the numerical experiments
Parameter 2 3 4 5
Pop size 50
Max no evaluations (coalitional evaluations) 2× 109
scaling factor F 0.5
Crossover rate 0.9
Two different variants of A-CrDE that use:
• the generative relation proposed in 3.1 - A-CrDE;
• the probabilistic generative relation proposed in 3.2 - pA-CrDE, with
p taking values 10%, 20%, 30%, and 40%;
are studied.
5.1. Game 1
The following continuous two person game [28]:
u1(s1, s2) = 3s
2
1 − s
2
2 + 4s2,
u2(s1, s2) = −s
2
1 + s1 − 2s2,
where
si ∈ [−1, 1], i = 1, 2,
presents one strong Nash equilibrium, the strategy profile (1,−1) [29], located
on the Pareto frontier of the game.
The algorithm correctly computes the strong Nash equilibrium (with all
of the three proposed generative relations, in all runs). Figure 1 presents the
strong Nash equilibrium detected by A-CrDE for Game 1.
5.2. Game 2: The minimum effort coordination game
Game G2 is based on a micro-foundation model [30]. Another version of
this game is presented in [31].
Consider a n-person coordination game in which each player i chooses an
effort level si. The common part of the effort is determined by the minimum
effort of the n effort levels. Each players’ payoff is equal to the difference
between the common payoff and the cost of the players own payoff (αsi):
12
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f
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Figure 1: Game 1. Strong Nash equilibrium detected by A-CrDE. Game 1 has only one
NE that is also a SNE.
ui(s) = ci − αsi,
where
ci = min{s1, ..., sn},
and α < 1, si ∈ [0, 10], i = 1, ..., n.
Consider the cost α = 0.5.
The game has an infinite number of Nash equilibria (each si = s, i =
1, ..., n, s, si ∈ [0, 10] is a Nash equilibrium of the game), so all same effort
level is a Nash equilibrium. The game has only one strong Nash equilibrium
(si = 10, i = 1, ..., n), which is Pareto efficient.
The objective space for the two player version is illustrated in 2.
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Table 3: Average distance to the strong Nash equilibrium and standard deviation for 10
independent runs
No. of pl. A-CrDE pA-CrDE
10% 20% 30% 40%
2 0± 0 - - - 0± 0
5 0± 0 0± 0 0± 0 0± 0 0± 0
10 0± 0 0± 0 0± 0 0± 0 0± 0
15 5.34 ± 3.63 2.76 ± 8.30 6.19 ± 11.11 8.84 ± 14.52 6.45 ± 10.74
−5 0 5
−5
−4
−3
−2
−1
0
1
2
3
4
5
player 1 payoff
pa
lye
r 2
 p
ay
of
f
random generated solutions
Aumann equilibrium
Figure 2: Payoffs for the minimum effort coordination game for randomly generated strate-
gies
Table 3 presents the distance to the strong Nash equilibrium and standard
deviation for 10 different runs for A-CrDE and pA-CrDE. For 2, 5 and 10
players the algorithm finds correctly the strong Nash equilibrium. For 15
players a larger number of payoff function evaluations are necessary.
Table 4 presents the average time necessary to correctly compute the
strong Nash equilibrium a single run (with distance 0). The results confirm
that the algorithms are capable to locate the strong Nash equilibria even for
15 players, but they also indicate an exponential increase of the running time
with the number of players.
To illustrate the evolution of the search, detailed results obtained for five
players are depicted in Figures 3 and 4. Figure 3 illustrates the convergence
to the Aumann equilibrium for A-CrDE and pA-CrDE. Figure 4 depicts
boxplots for the five cases, in each case the generation number is reported
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Table 4: Average run time (CPU seconds) for strong Nash equilibrium detection with
different generative relations (10 independent runs)
No. of pl. A-CrDE pA-CrDE
10% 20% 30% 40%
2 0.06 - - - 0.06
5 0.1 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.08
10 5.82 0.73 1.25 2.05 2.53
15 328.66 85.11 143.6 206.43 229.05
1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
0
0.5
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1.5
2
2.5
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3.5
4
4.5
no. of evaluations (*50000)
di
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pA−CrDE (p=10%)
A−CrDE
pA−CrDE (p=20%)
pA−CrDE (p=30%)
pA−CrDE (p=40%)
Figure 3: Converge to the strong Nash equilibrium for 5 players. Values are smoothed
using a moving average filter (with the MATLAB smooth function)
(for ten runs), in which the correct strong Nash equilibrium is obtained.
The same type of results obtained for ten players are depicted Figures 5 and
6. The same conclusions can be drawn for both cases: in terms of payoff
function evaluations, pA-CrDE seems to converge fastest for small values of
p; A-CrDE has the slowest convergence. Boxplots representing the number
of generations necessary to converge indicate that there are no significant
differences between methods. A Wilcoxon sum rank test for assessing the
statistical difference between means confirms this assumption.
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Figure 4: Converge to the strong Nash equilibrium for five players (number of generations
in 10 runs)
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Figure 5: Converge to the strong Nash equilibrium for ten players. The values are
smoothed using a moving average filter (with the MATLAB smooth function)
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Figure 6: Converge to the strong Nash equilibrium for ten players (number of generations
in 10 runs)
6. Conclusions
This paper presents an efficient approach to the problem of computing
strong Nash equilibria by using evolutionary computation and generative
relations. A theoretical framework presenting two generative relations and
an empirically designed sets the basis for the evolutionary method.
A differential evolution algorithm is adapted to search for SNEs by simply
adding a generative relation in the replacing procedure of the method.
Numerical examples illustrate the efficiency of the approach. For the
minimum effort game, the third variant of the method correctly computes
the SNE for instances up to 150 players.
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